

Research Article

Kurdish Political aspiration in Post Ba'athist Iraq

Mohammed Afroz

Research Scholar, Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi-110025

Email: afrozjamia@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The Kurdish Political aspiration in the Post Ba'athist Iraq has been a critical area to study. The present paper seeks an attempt to understand the political aspirations in Iraq which is being described as democratic and federal in character with the provisions for proportional representations, represents the fifth phase of its perpetual evolution and transformation since its inception. Large chunks of the people of Kurdish ethnicity were made part of the evolving Turkish, Syrian, Iranian and Iraqi polity. They came face to face with new political reality, which either refused to acknowledge and honour the sensibilities related to their political aspiration and cultural identity or forcefully transformed them into a permanent 'fifth columnist' and a thorn in the flesh of the new evolving polity. Since then people of Kurdish ethnicity are embroiled into embedded and perpetual conflicts everywhere and fighting the assimilationist forces represented by the ethnicized nation states of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq-till Saddam led Baathist regime. Kurds of Iraq are confronting is conceptualized in terms of historical legacies and the subsequent political developments owing to the internal factors, regional geo-strategic situation and the interference of the foreign powers in the paper. It also highlights the domestic, regional and international factors which have been shaping Kurdish question in Iraq and elsewhere.

KEYWORDS: Kurds, Aspirations, Assimilations, Conflicts, Federal, Conflicts.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The political system of contemporary Iraq, which is being described as democratic and federal in character with the provisions for proportional representations, represents the fifth phase of its perpetual evolution and transformation since its inception as a sovereign state after the First World War Owing to French and British imperial political machination and manipulation many artificial states came into being in West Asia, Iraq is one of them. Peoples from different ethnicity and religious-sectarian persuasions were lumped together and put under a centralized political authority without any shade of democracy and political pluralism. These developments set the patterns of state and communities relationship with the centralized political authority. One of the communities, which suffered most because of the externally imposed process of politico-territorial permutation and combination, was the Kurdish ethnicity, Kurdish territory and thus the community was subjected to undergo multiple fragmentations.

Large chunks of the people of Kurdish ethnicity were made part of the evolving Turkish, Syrian, Iranian and Iraqi polity. They came face to face with new political reality, which either refused to acknowledge and honours the sensibilities related to their political aspiration and cultural identity or forcefully transformed them into a permanent 'fifth columnist' and a thorn in the flesh of the new evolving polity. Since then people of Kurdish ethnicity are embroiled into embedded and perpetual conflicts everywhere and fighting the assimilationist forces represented by the ethnicized nation states of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq-till Saddam led Ba'athist regime.

Iraqi history is replete with great political uncertainty and enmeshed conflicts. However, despite many vicissitudes and violent change and transformation, the basic political set up remained intact, especially from the Kurdish perspective. A new era of real change and transformation surfaced in the aftermath of the Gulf war

It in 1991 and the subsequent developments inside Iraq and in the region. The scenarios, which surfaced as a result of the developments, can rightly be characterized as a paradigm shift, especially Iraqi state vis-à-vis its Kurdish community. The process for a paradigm shift started with the establishment of a 'safe haven' and 'no fly zone' over the Kurdish region of Iraq. This transformed the region into a de facto state, enjoying complete autonomy, including the financial autonomy. During the period of the so-called 'safe haven' and 'no fly zone' the Kurdish leadership developed their political institutions through a regularly held electoral process. It provided huge opportunity for the region to consolidate its ethnic demands. This autonomy provided enough leverage to the political elites for playing a decisive role in national politics too.

In a nutshell, it can be said that the Kurdish community of Iraq was given the status of being a 'state' within a state which later on, in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Ba'athist State in 2003, were transformed into a constitutional Kurdish regional government with the enactment of a democratic and federal constitution in Iraq in 2005.

However, there is another side of the story of the political development in Iraq. Despite the abovementioned fundamental change of great implication, decades old Kurdish demands are still unaddressed, which are breeding simmering discontents and great potential for future conflicts and regional destabilization too.

The issues with which Kurds of Iraq are confronting can be conceptualized in terms of historical legacies and the subsequent political developments owing to the internal factors, regional geo-strategic situation and the interference of the foreign powers. There have been a lot of domestic, regional and international factors, which have been shaping the Kurdish question in Iraq and elsewhere.

The study is about the issues involving Kurds in the post-Ba'athist Iraq. However, its antecedents cannot be overlooked. This study tried to address the historical role of the Kurdish nationalist movement in impacting Iraqi politics from 1920 to the fall of Saddam Hussein and later in formation of the new constitutional government and power sharing arrangements between various factions

especially KRG and the federal government of Iraq.

KURDS AND KURDISTAN

The Kurds are indigenous communities of their historical land called Kurdistan for over 4,000 years. They are mainly scattered along the Zagros and Taurus mountainous regions. Kurds as an ethnic group have a clan history with over 800 tribes in Kurdistan (Kerim, 2004;).(not mentioned in the end references) Various myths exist concerning Kurdish origins. According to the myth, the Kurds descended from children hidden in mountains to escape Zahhak, a child-eating giant. This myth links them mystically with 'the mountain' and also implies, since the myth refers to children rather than one couple, that they may not all be of one origin (David, 2000;).(not mentioned in the end references) A similar story suggests that they are the descendents of King Solomon's slave girls, sired by a demon named Jasad, and driven by the angry king into the mountains. Another myth claims that the Prophet Abraham's wife was a Kurd, a native of Harran and thus validates the Kurdish identity within the mainstream of monotheism.

Most Kurdish tribal groups have their own real or imagined ancestors, which often harks back either to a hero of the early Islamic period or even to descent from the Prophet himself. This was a particularly attractive form of legitimating during the period of the Islamic empire. Several chiefly families claimed either descent or association with the great early Islamic general Khalid-bin-Al-Walid. Others invoked Umayyad, Abbasid or Saladin connection (Van Bruinnesen, 1992: 23).

Kurds trace their civilization in Median Empire in sixth century, at the time of Arab conquest of Mesopotamia in the seventh century AD. Kurds are first non-Arab ethnic community who embraces Islam at the time of second Muslims Caliph Umar-bin-Al-Khattab. The name 'Kurds' was used to describe these nomadic people who lived in this region. The term 'Kurdistan' meaning 'the land of Kurds' first appeared in the twelfth century when the Turkish prince Sanandjar created a province with this name (Kerim, 2004: 07). Kurdistan must be considered a peripheral region lying along the geopolitical fault line between three power centres of West Asia until the beginning of the twentieth century. Almost every tribe or

tribal confederation possesses a strong sense of territorial identity alongside ideas of ancestry. Tribal chiefs or Aghas administer local administration. Their relationship with the state was based on the patron–clients framework of relationship.

The range of the land, which Kurdistan encompasses, has fluctuated historically. However, it remains predominantly the geographical region that spreads across the mountainous area where the borders of contemporary Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey meet. Estimated figures show that 28 million Kurds are dispersed throughout these four states, with the highest numbers of 15 million, roughly 20% of the total population of Kurds living in Turkey and around four million in Iraq, approximately 25% of the total population, 7 million of the Kurd population in Iran consisting of 15% of the total population. Kurds are currently the fourth largest ethnic group in West Asia, a human culture that dispersed over a vast land, which has no fixed borders and claim to that territory (Gunter, 1999: 67).

KURDISH COMMUNITY FROM ISLAMIC ERA TO OTTOMANS IMPERIAL RULE

Kurds had a vital role to play in the Islamic empire. The geo-strategic positions place them in the borderland, which was very vulnerable due to European aggression. Therefore, they used to work as border guards. This is why, throughout the Muslim Empire, Kurds were considered the frontier of Islam. Salahuddin Ayubi the great, who fought against crusades, was himself a Kurd but never considered himself as a Kurdish leader rather than Islamic. At that time ethnicity was not a matter of separate identity and inclusion or exclusion was not based on these affiliations. Islamic identity was a basic form of social solidarity based on common religious affiliations. Kurds had a special role to play in the Empire and thus were given autonomous entity. Kurds under the Ottomans had also remained in regions that were loyal to the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish community in the north enjoyed a semi-autonomous entity.

THE EMERGENCE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM

There is no doubt that the Kurdish people had existed as an identifiable group for possibly more than two thousand years, but it was only in the early years of

the twentieth century that they acquired ‘a sense of community’ as Kurds. This sense of national community occurred at more or less the same time that Turks and Arabs also began to embrace an ethnic sense of identity in place of the two previous basic forms of solidarity. However, in the twentieth century, ethnicity assumed a prominent place as an identity marker not only in Iraq, but across the region with the introduction of the western concept of a nation-state. The inability of the ‘imposed’ Westphalia state system to accommodate the aspiration of Kurdish self-determination has relegated the various Kurdish minorities found in West Asian states to a life of oppression. The right of self-determination would be defined in a limited manner as to effectively exclude Kurds. The plight of the people to a greater or lesser extent has been that of the repression of their collective identity at the hand of states that have sought to establish a homogenous nationalist culture based on things Turkish Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian. Each state has been providing ‘rear back seat’ for Kurdish insurgents against each other.

In Kurdistan, however, the politicization of ethnicity was to dominate the course of history, after the Iraqi state was founded, and it gradually nationalized access to position of power, and put restrictions on all those not considered members of the politically dominated groups. The British and Iraqi monarchs failed to unite the country’s diverse population, an artificial construct that had been cobbled together of the three provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. The Monarchs, nationalists and the Ba’athist regime in Iraq have all failed ultimately to establish a political system of rule. Despite the many changes in Iraqi politics, the Kurds were considered as the ‘enemy of the state’ and were continuously excluded through-out the period. Therefore, Kurds continued their national struggle for self-rule.

The more coercive method applied, the demand became non negotiable. In August 1991, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Kurdish uprising, which spread rapidly and captured most of the northern region, was protected and declared ‘No fly Zone’ by allied forces. This created a semi-autonomous region and led to self governance.

The Kurdish aspiration and the nature of political opportunities provided by the Iraqi state and the consistent silence of regional and international actors to recognize

it fearing opening of new doors for secessions because large numbers of Kurds in other countries view them as a potential threat to their nation-building and have either refused to acknowledge the existence of the Kurds (Turkey) or in practice sought to exclude them as a group (Iran, Iraq, Syria); prioritizing instead Turkish, Arab or Persian ethnic identities. These four states have been at odds with each other over many issues. However, their single point of common ground has been the consensus that no examples of Kurdish self-determination should be allowed in the region. The Kurds are not recognized as a state because their lands are part of already existing states, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. To create an independent state of Kurdistan would threaten the territorial integrity of pre-existing states. No state will support a doctrine that sanctions its own potential break-up.

KURDS IN CONSTITUTIONAL ERA: IRAQI-SPECIFIC SITUATIONS

The removal of the Ba'ath regime in 2003 heralded a new period of consolidation and prosperity for the Kurds, although coloured with heightened political uncertainty. The ratification of the new Iraqi constitution in 2005 stipulates that Iraqi Kurdistan is a federal entity recognized by Iraq; and special provisions are added for the KRG, the areas are divided into three governorates of the Dohuk, Erbil and Sulamania. Autonomy from Baghdad has revitalized the Kurdish sense of nationhood. The popular discourse in Kurdistan, among Kurds, rapidly became dominated by notions of Kurdayeti (Kurdishness), Kurdish nationalism.

With the demise of the Ba'athist regime, Kurds have become kingmakers in Baghdad. No federal government can be established without them. The Kurdish parties are just taking advantage of the situation to advance their agenda, to use a once wide but now narrowing window of opportunity to expand the territory and natural resources (oil, gas and water) under their control, as well as the powers they exercise within that territory. They hope thereby to build the foundations of an independent Kurdish state. Their objective is to use the levers of the state for a two-fold purpose: to prevent a powerful central state from deploying its security forces against the Kurdish population, as happened so often during the past century, and to maximize Kurdistan's chances to secede. These twin goals are closely intertwined; jointly,

they define the Kurdish past, present and future.

On identity issues, the Kurds won recognition of Kurdish as one of the two official languages of the Iraqi state by the new Iraqi Constitution. Kurds almost universally support the concept of Kurdish independence, when they went to the polls as Iraqis in January 2005, at that time, they were polled informally by volunteers on the question of independence, and 95% responded that they favoured it. Many Kurds in the Diaspora express a desire to return to a 'free and independent Kurdistan.' Diaspora life effects Kurdish identity and the priorities of political movements for a future Kurdistan.

The Iraqi constitution states that the governor system in Iraq is republic, federal and democratic, in which powers are shared with the federal government and the regional authorities. The federal system is based on the historical and geographical facts and not upon nationality, ethnicity or religion. Federalism continues to be considered by many to be "the best guarantee for a united Iraq". Federalism to the Kurds originally meant a confederation, a mutual choice by Kurdish Iraq and Arab Iraq to continue to live together, but in a very loose arrangement that would afford the Kurds maximum autonomy over their own affairs.

On hydrocarbon issues, the struggle between the federal government and Kurdistan regional government concerns about political, ideological and obviously territorial issues. Among the many disputes boiling the Iraqi body politic, one has been particularly difficult over Kirkuk. They disagree also on how they should divide power between them, manage the country's hydrocarbons wealth and distribute revenues from oil and gas sales. The dispute over its administrative status is contaminating and even paralyzing national politics.

The most serious is the danger of extreme disparities and inequalities in wealth between different regions. According to the World Bank 'resource dependence is one of the most important causes of civil wars'. Iraq has the world's second-largest endowment of oil, amounting to 11% of the global total. About 75% of Iraq's proven oil reserves are concentrated in the three southern governorates, with 25% in the middle and the north. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) controls about 6% of these northern reserves (or 15%, if the Kirkuk area is included) (Source: Revenue Watch Institute).

CLAIM OR COUNTER CLAIM OVER TERRITORIES

Since 2003 the Kurds have been considered kingmakers in Iraq, playing a key role in keeping the country together while negotiating Kurdish nationalist demands in Baghdad. Henceforth, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has taken advantage of the weak central government, an unclear Iraqi constitution and high-level positions to establish its place in a federal Iraqi state. The Baghdad government claims that the Kurds, having been over-involved in obtaining their political goals, are holding the country's political progress hostage to their demands. The territorial boundaries of the KRG are a particular source of contention and a key threat to Iraqi internal security, Kirkuk is one of the major flashpoints in relations between the different groups in Iraq, as the city is claimed by Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen alike. Another equally important but time and again ignored territory-sharing dispute centre's on the city of Mosul. The explosive web of claims and counter-claims regarding Kirkuk, which sits on top of some of Iraq's most important oil fields, with 12% of Iraq's oil reserves has made the city a potential flashpoint for Kurdish–Arab conflict. The Kurds claim the Kirkuk province based on their majority status in the province. Plans for the Kurdification of Kirkuk have already begun. The most conflicting issue is Article 140; which provides an official referendum to determine the future of Kirkuk. At the time of referendum people had to vote either to remain a part of Iraq or to join the Kurdistan region and be ruled under KRG.

A potential clash was postponed with UN special representative Staffan de Mistura's proposal to defer the process by 6 months. In reality, this has been postponed indefinitely. There is a possibility that Article 140 would be implemented in the near future, which could spark a new wave of intra-state violence and ignite inter-state direct confrontation. One of the crucial Kurdish demands is an assurance from the new prime minister to carry out Article 140 of the Constitution, a hotly contested course that outlines the steps towards a referendum on the fate of the disputed northern territories, including Kirkuk.

Another factor, the Iraqi constitution seemed to stress territorial federalism. Such an emphasis seems to have brought about the sudden emergence of a strategy of

land grabbing. The Kurds in the north and the Shi'a in the south began to unfold plans to control larger swaths of Iraqi territory as their own. However, such a tendency created new communal zones in which multiple communities reside for the time being. Such a development will undermine the development of an Iraq of multiple ethnic and religious communities living in a state of pluralism and democracy. It will create more or less three distinctly separate and internally homogeneous regions with very little commonalities. Then, the ground will be set for a centrifugal drive to separate Iraq into three different states or Kurds in the north, Shi'ite Arabs in the south and the Sunni Arabs in the middle. What seems to await Iraq is a form of dissimilar federalism based upon territory. Such an environment would be most fruitful for the eruption of some kind of civil war, which may even kindle new conflicts between the neighbours of Iraq and even impulsive regional wars between Arabs, Iranians and Turks.

The question now is whether the Kurdish parties have an inherent interest in the formation of additional regions in the rest of Iraq or whether they could live with an Arab–Kurdish confederation that would be asymmetrical: Kurdistan living side by side with an Arab–Iraq decentralized along governorate boundaries. It may be difficult to undo the damage, although a new, but very loose, coalition of Iraqi parties is trying. Spanning the ethno-sectarian divide, these parties have a nationalist feeling in common. The real question is how the Kurds will be able to reach a state of relative security. The KRG has set its sights on Kirkuk, seeing safety in territory and economic power. The better way forward for the Kurds in their legitimate quest for security may therefore lie in a push for the maximum that is realistically and consensually attainable at this historical juncture, to strike deals that will be both beneficial and durable. These deals are unlikely to yield exclusive Kurdish control over Kirkuk. However, they may allow the KRG to develop its own oil and gas fields under federal legislation that will draw the international investments the Kurds require to explore and develop their natural wealth. Such deals could also produce a boundary to the Kurdistan region that would be accepted by Iraq and neighbouring states and as such could be recognized officially by the UN and major states, and thus could attract guarantees of sanctity.

KURDISH DEVELOPMENT INSIDE IRAQ AND ITS IMPLICATION ON NEIGHBOURS

The United States led invasion and the subsequent war in Iraq can certainly be considered as the second major assault on international peace witnessed in the early phase of the twenty first century. George W. Bush's regime-changing war in Iraq is widely seen as an oil war a grab for the second-largest petroleum reserves in the world. Iraqi oil was the major hope for neo-conservatives and their allies to push the war. The main aim was the hegemonic control over oil and undermining Arab regimes and making the region safer for the US and Israel.

Ba'athist Iraq was the citadel of Arab nationalism and the most powerful frontline gate against Zionism and colonialism. One of the objectives of regime change in Iraq through invasion cum occupation was to transform Iraq from a frontline gate against Zionism into a pliant state and thus to strengthen Zionism. Israel, the greatest beneficiary of regime change in Iraq, looked for another ally in the region that would serve the very same purpose with fewer unknowns in the future. The best candidate would be the Kurds in northern Iraq, who are not hostile towards them, nor are they likely to have an apolitical system or a bureaucratic mechanism, which might create friction vis-à-vis the expectations of the US or Israel particularly in the military domain. Then, the Kurds will be obliged to those who will have contributed, in one way or another, to achieving their ultimate objective of creating an independent state.

However, the specific nature of the superficial security threat posed by anticipated Kurdish gains in post-war Iraq varied from state to state. In Syria, long-standing Ba'athist restraints on Kurdish access to the political system, along with a policy of Arabization that settled Arabs on confiscated Kurdish lands, had generated a host of Syrian Kurdish opposition groups that were at once well organized and motivated to seek redress for Kurdish grievances. By way of contrast, Iran and Turkey focused not on Kurdish existential threats, but on the potential for Kurdish secessionist violence to put in danger their territorial integrity. This concern resulted from past experiences with nationalist-inspired Kurdish violence.

The post-war regional scenario impeded their political

aspiration, which was brewing beneath. Understandably, the neighbours have little sympathy for Kurdish separatist aspirations in northern Iraq. In the past, Turkey, Iran and Syria have tried to collaborate on limiting Kurdish progress. The problem they face at the moment, however, given the chaos that has followed the war, is that any attempt directed at deterring separatism could easily backfire and have the opposite effect. On the other hand, both Iran and Turkey can potentially influence the future of Iraqi Kurdistan through economic and political incentives. They both can provide linkages with other parts of the world and access to markets and trade.

CONCLUSION

The great change has not been in Kurdish political demands, but rather in the way Kurds view themselves at a mass level. This now has very real policy implications. Kurds, shore up by their party's electoral success in the 2010 parliamentary election, since then the president of KRG is intensifying his demands for greater sovereignty and control of oil. In spite of all odds, the Kurdish president, Massoud Barzani, has been heavily courted for support in forming coalitions in the new government to maximize benefit in the power-sharing arrangement. The Kurdistan regional Parliament quietly created a new committee tasked with reclaiming 'historic Kurdish land' meaning contested areas like Kirkuk and hot spots in Nineveh Province under the regional government's de facto control, but nominally still attached to the central government.

The diversity of political actors in Iraq and the confluence of regional and international policy problems with Iraqi affairs complicate efforts to predict the course of events in Iraq. Most Arab governments fear a general failure of the new Iraqi government and the prospect of chaos that could leave Iraq's minority Sunni Arab population vulnerable. Reconciling these differences of opinion is likely to remain difficult and could complicate efforts to secure the cooperation of Iraq's Arab neighbours with new stabilization initiatives.

The Kurds were also hoping the new Iraq would take a different path than previous regimes and would finally respect their long-standing struggle for freedom and national rights. The last 8 years, however, have proven that Iraq's new political elites haven't learned much from

the modern history of Iraq, and day by day, the vision of Iraq of becoming a federal and democratic entity is losing momentum. During this period, the new Iraqi governments have adapted similar methods to pre-2003 regimes in dealing with the Kurd's national and political demands. There are obvious signs from the current Iraqi government, which seems to have more confidence, is trying to create a strong and centralized system and take away most of the political and economic power from the regions, especially the KRG, which is contrary to its previous support for the federal system in Iraq.

When the Kurds review the events of the last 8 years in Iraq, it is logical to think about their best interests and look for their own solution, even if it is against all political realities of the region. It also should be kept in mind that the possible failure of adopting a federal system in Iraq will increase the gravity of the political situation in Iraq and the whole region.

In the end, the Kurds will have to choose between endemic contention and a compromise agreement that could buy them peace for a generation or more. As long as US forces remain in Iraq, the window of opportunity for the second option is unlikely to close. And enhanced autonomy (Kurdish federalism) will not extinguish the dream for Kurdish independence; to the contrary, through a combination of good governance (fighting corruption, in particular), strong regional economic relations and good neighbourliness, it may bring closer the day that this dream can be realized.

As a final thought, while the whole region is under a massive political and social tsunami, the international community should come to the realization that the emergence of South Sudan as the world's 193rd country will bring more strength to Kurdistan's demand of sovereignty and statehood in the near future. It will be near-impossible to resolve the crisis without tackling outstanding nationwide political issues.

REFERENCES

- Bruinnessen, V. MM. (1992).** "Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan", Zed Books: London, pp.23
- David, M. (2000).** "A Modern History of the Kurds", I.B. Tauris Publishers: New York. pp.4.
- David, M. (2000).** "The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, present and future", London Pluto Press. pp. 12–13

Gunter M.M. (1999). "The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis", St. Martin's Press: London, pp.67.

Kerim, Y. (2004). "The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future", Pluto press: London, pp.05–07.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahmad, F. (1993).** "The Making of Modern Turkey", Routledge: New York.
- Ahmed, N. 2003).** "Behind the War on Terror: Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq", Clairview: East Sussex.
- Alan, D. (1984).** "Middle East Crisis: Decision making in 1958, 1970, and 1973", University of California Press: Berkeley. NOT CITED IN THE TEXT
- Andrew, M. (2007).** "Tactical and Strategic Factors in Turkey's Offensive Against the PKK", *Terrorism Focus*, 4, (31).
- Badeau, S.J. (1968).** "The American Approach to the Arab World", Harper Collins: New York.
- Beaumont, P. (1996).** "Agricultural and Environmental Changes in the Upper Euphrates Catchment of Turkey and Syria and their Political Economic Implications", *Applied Geography*.
- Paul, B. (1991).** "Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison", Sage: New Delhi.
- Brendan, O.L. M, J. and Khaled S, eds (2005).** "The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq", University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, PA.
- Brown, M. E. (1993).** "Causes and Consequences of Ethnic Conflict", In *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.
- Burke, A. (2000).** "Pipeline Politics: US Corporations Lead Foreign Economic Policy", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*.
- David, C. (1998).** "Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict", Hill and Wang: New York.
- John, C. (1957).** "Kurds, Turks, and Arabs; Politics, Travel, and Research in North-Eastern Iraq", 1919–1925. Oxford University Press: New York, NY.
- Chomsky, N. (1996).** "World Orders Old and New", Columbia University Press: New York.
- Cleveland, W. (1994).** "A History of the Modern Middle East", Westview Press: Boulder, CO.
- David, R. (2006).** "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement. Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity," Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
- David, M. (2000).** "The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, present and future", Pluto Press: London
- Mark, D. (2002).** "Global Governance and the New Wars", Zed: London.
- Eagleton, W. (1963).** "The Kurdish Republic of 1946", Oxford University Press: London.
- Ellis, A. (2003).** "The politics of electoral systems in transition", In: Andreas Wimmer et al., *Facing Ethnic Conflict. Toward a New Realism*. Rowman & Littlefield Edmonds: Boulder.

Kurdish Political aspiration in Post Ba'athist Iraq

- Esman, M. J. (1977).** "Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Industrialized Societies", In *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, (ed.). Milton J. Esman. Ithaca, Cornell University Press: NY.
- Faroqhi, S. et al. (1994).** "An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, Volume Two: 1600–1914", Cambridge University Press: New York.
- Fearon, J. D and David D. L. (2003).** "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", in *American Political Science Review*. 97 (1).
- Frank, H. (2007).** "Reports of PKK Internal Dissent on the Rise", *Terrorism Focus*, Vol IV, Issue 30.
- Fuccaro, N. (1999).** "The Other Kurds: Yazidis in Colonial Iraq", I.B. Tauris: New York.
- Ghassemlou, A R. (1993).** "Kurdistan in Iran", in Gerard Chaliand, (ed.), *A People without a Country*, Zed Books: London.
- Graham-Brown, Sarah. (1999).** "Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq", New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Gresh, A. (1998).** "Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and their Impact on the Middle East", *The Middle East Journal*.
- Grondin, D. (2006).** "Mistaking Hegemony for Empire: Neoconservatives, the Bush Doctrine, and the Democratic Empire", *International Journal*, 61(1).
- Guibernau, M. and John H. (2001).** "Understanding Nationalism", Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Gunter, M. (1999).** "The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis", St. Martin's Press: New York, NY.
- Gurr, T. R. (1993).** "Why minorities rebel: A global analysis of communal mobilization and conflict since 1945", in *International Political Science Review*. 14 (2).
- Gurr, T. R. (1994).** "Peoples against the State: Ethno political conflict in the changing world system", in *International Studies Quarterly* 38.
- Hannum, H. (2003).** "Territorial autonomy. Permanent solution or step toward secession?", in Andreas Wimmer et al., *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*. Rowman & Littlefield: Boulder.
- Harff, B. (2003).** "No lessons learned from the Holocaust? Assessing the risks of genocide and political mass murder since 1955", in *American Political Science Review*. 97 (1).
- Hechter, M. (2003).** "Containing nationalist violence", in Andreas Wimmer et al., *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*. Rowman & Littlefield: Boulder.
- Hiro, D. (1992).** "Desert Shield to Desert Storm", Paladin: London.
- Horowitz, Donald (1985). "Ethnic Groups in Conflict", University of California Press: Berkeley.
- Horowitz, Donald (2003) (forthcoming). "Some realism about peacemaking", In: Andreas Wimmer et al., *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*. Rowman & Littlefield: Boulder.
- Izady, M. (1992).** "The Kurds: A Concise Handbook", Crane Russak: Washington, DC.
- James B. and Lee H. (2006).** "The Iraq Study Group Report", Vintage Books: New York.
- Jinadu, A. (1995).** "Federalism, the consociational state, and ethnic conflict in Nigeria", in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*. 15.
- Journal f Turkish Weekly. (2007).** "American Senior General: U.S. military will do nothing against PKK terrorists", <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=49824>.
- Kälin, W. (2003).** "Decentralized governance in fragmented societies: Solution or cause of new evils?", in Andreas Wimmer et al., *Facing Ethnic Conflicts. Toward a New Realism*. Rowman & Littlefield: Boulder.
- Karadaghi, K. (1993).** "The Two Gulf Wars: The Kurds on the World Stage, 1979–1992" in Gerard Chaliand, (ed.), *A People without a Country*, Zed Books: London.
- Kasfir, N. (1979).** "Explaining Ethnic Political Participation", in *World Politics*. 31.
- Kendal, N. (1993).** "The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire", In: Gerard Chaliand, (ed.). *A People without a Country*, Zed Books: London.
- Kuniholm, B.R. (2002).** "9/11, the Great Game, and the Vision Thing: The Need for (And Elements of) a More Comprehensive Bush Doctrine", *The Journal of American History*, 89 (2).
- Kuniholm, B. (2001).** "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Difference in European and U.S. Attitudes, and Challenges for Turkey", *Turkish Studies*.
- Lemarchand, R. (1994).** "Burundi. Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice", Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Lijphart, A. (1977).** "Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration", Yale University Press: New Haven.
- Lijphart, A.. (1977).** "Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration", Yale University Press: New Haven.
- Eric von tersch. (2006).** "Developing a Strategic Partnership with Turkey", Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College.
- Lustick, I. (1979).** "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control", *World Politics*. 31 (3).
- Makiya, K. (1993).** "Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World", W.W. Norton and Compan: New York.
- Makiya, K. (1998).** "Republic of Fear. The Politics of Modern Iraq", University of California Press: Berkeley. McGarry. and B. O'Leary (eds). *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, Routledge: London.
- Marshall, J.M.(2003).** "Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives", *Foreign Affairs*, 82 (6).
- David, M. (1996).** "A Modern History of the Kurds", I.B. Tauris: New York.
- Gordon, M. R. and Bernard e t (2006).** "Cobra II", Pantheon Books: New York
- Michael S R, (ed.). 2003. "Dangerous Neighborhood, Contemporary Issues in Turkey's Foreign Relations", Philadelphia: The Foreign Policy Research Institute.
- Mutlu, S. (1996).** "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 28, (4), a.
- Nakash, Y. (1994).** "The Si'is of Iraq", Princeton University Press: Princeton.

Mohammed Afroz

- Nazdar, M. (1993).** "The Kurds in Syria", In: Gerard Chaliand, (ed.), A People without a Country. Zed Books: London.
- Newman, (ed.). (1999).** "Boundaries, Territory, and Postmodernity", Frank Cass: Portland.
- Nordlinger, E. A. (1972).** "Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies", Center for International Affairs of Harvard University: Cambridge.
- Nouri, Talabany (2007). "Who Owns Kirkuk? The Kurdish Case", Middle East Quarterly <http://www.meforum.org/article/1075>.
- NPR Weekend Edition (2007).** "Turk-Iraq Conflict Could End With PKK Ceasefire", <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15691281>.
- Olson, R. (1989).** "The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925. Austin", University of Texas Press: TX
- Olson, R. (2001).** "Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia, 1991–2000. Costa Mesa", Mazda Press: CA.
- Paul JW. (2000).** "Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey", Zed Books: New York.
- Paul, A. (2002).** "Kurdish Rebel Group Changes Name, Announces End of Insurgency", The Associated Press.
- Paul, C. and Anke H. (2000).** "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", Washington: World Bank Development Research Group.
- Peter, G. (1983).** "Israel in the Mind of America", Alfred A Knopf: New York.
- Vanly, I. S. (1993).** "Kurdistan in Iraq", In: Gerard Chaliand, (ed.), A People without a Country. Zed Books: London.
- Yergin, D. (1991).** "The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power", Simon & Schuster: New York.

Internet sources

1. www.cnn.com
2. www.smh.com (Sydney Morning Herald)
3. www.nytimes.com
4. www.presstv.ir
5. www.guardian.co.uk
6. www.reuters.com
7. www.washingtonpost.com
8. www.atimes.com (Asia times)
9. www.ft.com (Financial Times)
10. www.un.org
11. www.bbc.co.uk
12. www.foreignpolicy.com
13. www.wsj.com (Wall Street Journal)
14. www.aljazeera.com
15. www.arabnews.com